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What does it mean to be an aesthetic beholder? Is it different than simply being a 
perceiver? Most theories of aesthetic perception focus on 1) features of the perceived 
object and its presentation or 2) on psychological evaluative or emotional responses 
and intentions of perceiver and artist. In this chapter I propose that we need to look at 
the process of engaged perception itself, and further that this temporal process of be-
coming a beholder must be understood in its embodied, contextual and dynamic speci-
ficity. Through both phenomenological and neuroscientific explorations I analyze what 
is characteristic about a more “aesthetic stance” and argue that there is a certain asym-
metry between beholder and beheld, which has to do with a disengagement of goal-
directed action, and which allows for other kinds of perceptual involvement than in a 
more “practical stance”. It is a multi-disciplinary project integrating a sensorimotor no-
tion of aesthetic affordances, 18th century philosophy, and large-scale brain network 
findings. What ensues is a new dynamic framework for future empirical and theoretical 
research on aesthetic perception.  
                                                
1 This chapter is based on research undertaken while a Fellow of Art & Neuroscience at the 
Italian Academy of Advanced Studies in America at Columbia University (2011-2012). I am 
deeply thankful for this time, and in particular indebted to the academy’s director David Freed-
berg for his extensive involvement with this project and much needed harsh judgments of earlier 
drafts. Thanks also to my home institution, University of Massachusetts, Boston for continuous 
support. 
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The need for a more dynamic & contextual neuro-aesthetics 
 
Can science help us understand our engagements with art and aesthetic experiences 
in general? In recent years the field of “neuro-aesthetics” has exploded - articles and 
popular books on the topic seemingly popping up everywhere. Some humanists remain 
skeptical of these empirical endeavors and wonder what the many colorful brain scans 
can actually tell us about our deeply cultural aesthetic practices. I am sympathetic to 
some such criticisms.2 However, this chapter attempts to show that neuroscience can be 
an incredible resource for aesthetics – if indeed scientists take the dynamic, social and 
environmental complexities of both aesthetic experience and brain function more seri-
ously. I shall introduce the notion of the “aesthetic stance” to explore the conditions 
and consequences of becoming a beholder and then introduce a new dynamic approach 
to empirical aesthetics.  However, to see why such a framework could advance the field 
first a look at some high-profile work in neuro-aesthetics:  
• Beauty & reward centers: Semir Zeki’s lab has found that activity in frontal 
reward centers correlate with reported experiences of beauty, and consequently 
published an article entitled “Towards a Brain based Theory of Beauty”.3 The 
imaging findings appear solid, but one might ask whether the relation to reward 
centers alone does much to explain: 1) Why beauty is pleasurable to perceive? 
2) What beauty is, or 3) how beauty relates to art & aesthetics (as we likewise 
can appreciate the ugly, grotesque or horrific). 
• Visual gestalts & attractors: Ramachandran has proposed a series of “univer-
sal principles of art”4 mostly linked to gestalt principles and visual-reward con-
nections. His theory thus begins to answer why certain perceptual features are 
                                                
2 Given certain trends in neuroaesthetics some skepticism is understandable, e.g. Noë points 
out in his NYtimes piece “Art & the limits of neuroscience” that many simply apply what is 
known about perception to the experience of art. This seems confirmed in the examples below. 
3 Ishizu & Zeki (2011) 
4 Ramachandran & Hirstein (1999), chap. 7 & 8 in Ramachandran (2011). 
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more pleasing and attention grabbing than others. However, is it a problem that 
hedonic perception of say junk food and porn seems to be core examples?5 
• Movement perception & mirror neurons: Findings of mirror neurons has 
been applied to aesthetics by Freedberg & Gallese, suggesting an intimate rela-
tion between the motor system of the perceiver and the perceived, represented 
or implied movements in various art forms. Thus, the question of how art 
moves us is posed empirically. But this research has focused on the overlap be-
tween regular and aesthetic perceptions and so far not investigated potential 
dissimilarities.6 Further, motor responses have not been explored as dynami-
cally influenced by contextual affordances.7   
 
As exemplified here current neuroaesthetics often target perception and emotional 
responses generally, and hasn’t so far provided an empirical story of what makes aes-
thetic experiences special.8  This has lead some to propose that aesthetics ought to ig-
nore neuroscience.9 I shall try to show that the impediments of empirical approaches 
                                                
5 Pornography, with its easily digestible emotional and perceptual exaggerations, is almost 
the optimal artwork given Ramachandron’s “peak shift principle”. However, in a recent book 
Deidre Barrett argues that such supernormal stimuli drive our junk-food addictions and our con-
temporary culture’s fast and easy imagery. Thus, whether ‘peak shift’, ‘grouping’ etc. are uni-
versal principles of art is questionable. For counter-examples see Tyler’s “Is art lawful?” (1999). 
6 Freedberg & Gallese (2007). 
7 Mirror neurons and their broader sensorimotor and affordance context is discussed further 
down. 
8 Similar issues pertain to work by e.g. vision scientists like Margaret Livingstone (2002), 
and memory specialists like Eric Kandel (2012). Each contribute insights but there is a vacuum 
of theory of what the aesthetic realm actually is. 
9 Noë e.g. concludes: “…neuroscience, which looks at events in the brains of individual peo-
ple and can do no more than describe and analyze them, may just be the wrong kind of empirical 
science for understanding art.” Noë unfairly relegates neuroscience to matters ‘under the skull’ 
to contrast to his own ‘externalist’ approach. Cognitive neuroscience of course involves external 
and social stimuli, which admittedly often due to individualistic and modular assumptions are 
poorly chosen - but that is another issue. 
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might not be the physiology itself as much as the theories and paradigms typically used 
to study it.  
 
What is special about aesthetic experiences?  
Baumgarten is seen as the farther of the modern term ‘aesthetic’ as he imported this 
ancient Greek word for ‘sentient’ or ‘pertaining to the senses’ to its modern use.10 He 
and many other theoreticians have attempted to define this more narrow use, some via 
beauty and appraisal thereof, some via broader hedonic/emotional responses in the 
viewer, some via communication of intentions, some via aesthetic institutions or fea-
tures of objects defined as aesthetic etc.11 Though much can be learned from these defi-
nitions, they each seems to fall short of capturing the open-endedness of what can con-
stitute an aesthetic experience.12   
Hence, rather than predefining inherently aesthetic parameters of object and/or per-
ceiver, I will start with the more relational and embodied question of what it means to 
be an aesthetic beholder, and - perhaps more importantly - what conditions are condu-
cive to becoming an aesthetic beholder. A core empirical issue here is whether aesthetic 
experiences are constituted differently procedurally than regular perceptual experi-
ences. Thus, the possibility is explored that aesthetic experiences are not individuated 
as a subgroup of perceptual experiences simply by their special content or emotional 
consequences, but rather by their very process of perceptual engagement. I introduce a 
theoretical construct labeled “the aesthetic stance” to capture the temporally extended 
and complex processes that seem to characterize the broad embodied conditions of aes-
thetic experiences and responses. To fill in this basic framework, first a discussion of 
some relevant phenomenological and empirical observations.  
                                                
10 Baumgarten (1750) 
11 See e.g. Bell (1914), Langer (1953), Collingwood (1958), Gombrich (1960). 




a. The non-goal-directed aspect of aesthetic experience 
The question of what it means to be an aesthetic beholder as opposed to an ordinary 
perceiver is not new. Already in the 18th & 19th century many thinkers from Shaftes-
bury to Kant and Schopenhauer noted that one of the main characteristics of the aes-
thetic beholder was that of a certain “disinterestedness” and “psychological distance”.13 
The core idea being that to have genuine aesthetic experiences one had to somehow be 
disinterested in the ‘object as an object’, and thus give up one’s ordinary practical and 
goal-directed attitude to the perceived scene. It is this lack of goal-orientation that gives 
room for a “free play of the imagination” as Kant calls it.14 Though my account is rather 
different from that of Kant, these two connected insights of his will figure centrally in 
the aesthetic stance hypothesis proposed in the following: 
• The idea that a mutually opposing dynamic exists between a practical goal-
directed attitude and a more aesthetic attitude.  
• The link between the non-goal-directedness of the aesthetic stance and the pos-
sibility for “freedom of imagination” and deeper subjective involvement and 
contemplation.  
 
b. The emotional and bodily involvement  
It must be stressed that the aesthetic “distance” advocated here strictly pertains to in 
goal-directed actions and not to emotional or bodily involvement. Many have rightly 
criticized Kant’s idea of disinterestedness as he much like Plato shunned the emotions, 
and saw individual desires as a hindrance for aesthetic judgments. All the way back to 
                                                
13 See Cupchik (2002) for a great overview. 
14 See Kant (1790/2000) 
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Aristotle and Hume, thinkers have to the contrary highlighted the importance and inti-
mate connection between emotions and aesthetic experiences.15 Our metaphoric lan-
guage about aesthetic experiences attests to this undeniable importance of emotional, 
visceral and bodily factors. I.e. artworks can be ‘touching’, ‘moving’, ‘chilling’, ‘nau-
seating’ etc. Several empirical studies have now explored how aesthetic responses re-
late to changes in mood and emotional arousal. Kendall Eskine and colleagues have for 
example recently looked at the effect of induced autonomic and emotional states on 
aesthetic responses and found that the induced bodily states of fear can be reinterpreted 
as awe and sublimity in the new aesthetic context.16 Further it appears, from a recent 
study by the same group, that perceived size and wall position of an artwork is influ-
enced by prior knowledge about the social status of the artist.17 
Another line of research investigates how the perception of artworks literally can 
move our bodies and minds by modulating our sensorimotor circuits. I mentioned the 
Freedberg and Gallese study on motor facilitation above. They found that perceivers’ 
cortically “mirror” not only the actions of the bodies seen in representational art, but 
also the implied actions seen in the style and execution of abstract artworks.18 It is now 
becoming increasingly clear that motor responses to perceptual stimuli are highly dy-
namic and vary greatly depending on the broader practical scenario and the social and 
physical affordances that the perceiver is presented with.19 We must therefore study 
                                                
15 Jesse Prinz has several great papers on the issue see e.g. Prinz (2007). See also Freedberg 
(1991) 
16 See Eskine et al (2012). Interesting study showing how fear induced by watching horror 
movies can yield a feeling of the sublime in the context of visual art, and more so than other 
emotions such as happiness or general arousal. 
17 Jesse Prinz, Presentation at CUNY GC and personal communication. 
18 Freedberg & Gallese (2007). 
19 Newman-Norlund et al. 2007, Fuljii, Hihara & Iriki (2007) & Sartori et al (2011). See also 
Brincker (2010, 2012) for an analysis of the problems with the classic mirror neuron interpreta-
tions and arguments for the alternative “social affordance” hypothesis. See also Gallagher 
(2011) of a compatible criticism of mirror neurons and how they have been used in the neuro-
scientific theories of aesthetics. Due to his interest in intersubjectivity he focuses on the differ-
ence between affordances of ‘live’ versus representational art forms. I argue to the contrary that 
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embodied responses not only to the content or style of an artwork, but to its mode of 
presentation, i.e. the very fact that it is representational, on stage, and that you can walk 
around it etc. The motor and emotional responses must be understood within these 
larger contextual dynamics. My hypothesis is that there are “aesthetic affordances”, i.e. 
structural action invitations, which are instrumental in inducing an aesthetic rather than 
say a practical stance.20  
 
c. Aesthetic affordances and motor responses  
Whether we are at a play, inspecting a museum artwork or taking in a scenic view, 
aesthetic experiences generally show an asymmetric relation between beholder (per-
ceiver) and beheld (perceived). I suggest that this asymmetry is a hallmark of classic 
aesthetic experiences,21 which is procedurally induced and maintained and dynamically 
linked to a non-goal-directed attitude.  
In terms of aesthetic affordances, a concrete question is whether overall scenarios, 
which do not invite us to act, can induce this asymmetry. I.e. in many aesthetic settings 
the social and material context does not call for targeted action but rather halts us (af-
fords a disengagement of goal directed action), and as a result the aesthetic content 
seems to afford perception tout court.22 We can contrast such aesthetic “beholding” af-
fordances to perceptual scenarios in which the very structure of the environment calls 
                                                                                                                             
theater and performance art also presents an ‘edge of action’ asymmetry and thus affords a “non 
interactive” response. 
20 James and Eleanor Gibson were the first to coin the term ‘affordances’ (Gibson, 1979), but 
the concept has roots further back. The affordance concept became central to the experimental 
area of ecological psychology and classic exp. such as E. Gibson & Walk’s (1960) “visual cliff” 
paradigm and Warren's (1984) stair-climbing experiments. 
21 Interestingly many contemporary artists experiments with breaking down the “fourth wall” 
thus complicates the classic beholder-beheld relation. I am interested in exploring how such ar-
tistic experiments changes the aesthetic experience as well as the neurological processes in-
volved, however in this paper I focus on the classic asymmetric beholder-beheld relation. 
22 One might say that the original meaning of aesthetic as “pertaining to the senses” thus in 
terms of an exclusive affordance can be given new weight. 
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for active participation and where tools and people around us not only afford interac-
tion, but often demand it (e.g. when hanging a painting).  
The way our perceptual environment affords various action engagements has been 
experimentally assessed not only at the level of overt action response but also at the 
level of regional and cellular modulation in our cortical sensorimotor systems.23 Corti-
cal modulations have thus been shown to track the affordances or teleological opportu-
nities around us. I have argued elsewhere that the so embattled function of mirror neu-
rons should be understood as a part of this function. Classically described mirror 
neurons are notably modulated not by afforded actions but actual ongoing actions of ei-
ther self or others.24 The problem with popular interpretations is that these neurons have 
been idealized and lifted out of their broader neurological context, and have thus been 
misconstrued as forming an insular ‘mirror mechanism’ by which observed or implied 
actions automatically get ‘covertly simulated’.25 Evidence however suggests that our 
sensorimotor circuits integrate our own ongoing temporal and hierarchical action plans 
and reward evaluations with the perceived actions and affordances around us.26 The re-
sulting dynamic process, involving large fronto-parietal and sub-cortical areas, is piv-
otal for the ability to coordinate and chose our actions, and it is as an integrated part of 
this process that mirror neurons are likely to help us predict and track the actions of 
others.  
Now why are these debates over sensorimotor circuits important to the aesthetic 
stance hypothesis? Note that if responses to affordances and action perception are dy-
namically integrated with our action planning, then we should not expect our motor re-
sponse to depend simply on perceptual features within an artwork but more broadly 
                                                
23 For neurological findings of “affordance modulation” in fronto-parietal areas see e.g. 
Grezes & Decety 2002, Grèzes et al. 2003; Ferrari et al. 2005 & Newman-Norlund et al. 2007. 
24 Gallese et al. 1996. 
25 See Brincker (2010 & 2012) for an extensive discussion of this “caricature view” and see 
Gallagher (2007) and Zahavi (2008) for critiques of the simulation part. 
26 For a dissection of both monkey and human data see also Brincker (2010). 
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take the perceptual context into account. Further, this lends tentative support to the hy-
pothesis that modes of presentation like images not only has different affordances, but 
affords a sort of a ‘halt’ to our own ongoing environmental interactions. Most mirror 
neuron research has ignored the dynamics of such affordances, which is obvious as 
fMRI and behavioral paradigms typically use perception of images as experimental 
stimuli and yet generalize their conclusions as being about perception in general. How-
ever, from an affordance standpoint perception of action as image content does not af-
ford the perceiver an overt complimentary response beyond simply watching what is 
being presented.27 I propose 1) that sensorimotor circuits normally dynamically inte-
grate own action plans with the overall perceived action affordances, and 2) that they in 
the case of image perception, where own action plans are halted due to the asymmetry 
of presentation, show a tendency to ‘mirror’, i.e. channel the implied and actual actions 
perceived rather than engaging with them. This hypothesis has now been indirectly 
supported by several studies exploring more interactive and competitive experimental 
paradigms, which clearly shows a much more complex response28 than the more mirror-
ing response found using more imitative affordances.   
 
d. “Edge of action” helps induce beholding-beheld asymmetry  
Thus, these neuroscientific considerations indicate that our motor responses vary ac-
cording not only to perceived content but to broader practical contextual features. This 
is important, as my hypothesis is that there are aesthetic affordances, which invite a 
disengagement of action response or “non-goal-directed attitude”. Notably, most artis-
tic media (images, sculptures, stages, writings, recordings etc.) seems to invite asym-
metric, non-interactive modes of perception, in that the beholder perceives the beheld 
                                                
27 Brincker (2010, 2012), note that if images afford ‘non-engagement’ then the paradigm of 
using images to look for mirror responses has a rather problematic inherent ‘imitation bias’. 
28 Newman-Norlund et al. (2007), Fuljii, Hihara & Iriki (2007) & Sartori et al (2011). 
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but not the other way around. The further suggestion is that this asymmetry and lack of 
reciprocity in the aesthetic affordances precisely invites a different kind of engagement. 
Artworks thus typically brings us to an “edge of action”, an affordance of perceptual 
engagement but yet non-action, which opens up possibilities for using our minds – and 
brains – in ways we do not in our regular practically engaged modes of perception.29   
This ‘edge of action’ can also be seen in aesthetic engagements with non-artworks. 
The typical contexts of aesthetic moments in nature are remarkable. How often is it 
when we reach the top of the mountain, the edge of the cliff, the border of the water 
that we see the beauty of the landscape – which arguably also was in front of our eyes 
moments before? Similarly, environments, which have been rendered “un-actable”, 
such industrial decay, or micro-/macroscopic images of the unreachable all seem to in-
vite aesthetic attention. This might also play into artistic choices in installation and per-
formance art for example. Danto talked about the “transfiguration of the common 
place”,30 and the fact that Duchamp – consciously or not - decided to turn his urinal up-
side down can be seen as an important aesthetic affordance.  
Thus, aesthetic affordances of non-interaction are key to the establishment of an 
embodied aesthetic stance in the observer. However, it is crucial to note that such af-
fordances are neither necessary nor sufficient for aesthetic engagement: e.g. we daily 
look at images with goal-directed eyes, and often take an aesthetic stance towards prac-
tical objects. Take looking at an apple. We see it in the fruit bowl, want to eat it, and go 
                                                
29 Interestingly in this context, much contemporary theater and performance art purposefully 
“break the 4th wall” and precisely demand audience participation. Marina Abramowich’s “the 
artist is present” is a good example, where members of the audience where invited to sit silently 
face to face with the artist – thus invited into the artwork. However, other layers of traditional 
asymmetric framing properties were kept in place; larger audiences were classic beholders “out-
side” the artwork, and the inaction of “sitting silently” can be seen as an instructional “edge of 
action”. However, breaking the 4th wall means that the beholder to some degree simultaneously 
becomes beheld and the artwork therefore includes psychological reactions as a part of its con-
tent – but maybe many traditional works does as well. 
30 Danto (1974). With the idea of aesthetic affordance to halt habitual and goal-directed ac-
tion his famous dictum can be seen in a new light.  
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a head with a ‘grab-to-eat’ motion. Then the motion is arrested as e.g. inner distraction 
allows a sight of how the light catches the colors of its skin. We pull back in an aes-
thetic glance at the apple – before proceeding to eat it. The ‘edge of action’ here seems 
to be reached not so much by the contextual frames as by the interaction between sali-
ent visual properties and inner occupations such as a daydreaming mind.  
In brief, I have focused on the role of ‘edges of action’ as a set of contextual affor-
dances for establishing an aesthetic stance. Such concrete aesthetic affordances have 
been generally ignored. However, there are other external and internal key aspects of 
becoming a beholder.  
 
e. The role of “the other” & the relation to vulnerability & appraisal  
Introducing the idea of aesthetic experiences as typically happening on “the edge ac-
tion”, I drew attention to “non-art” aesthetic experiences of e.g. a sunset or an apple. 
What is interesting about both artworks and other artifacts (the abandoned building, a 
painting by an elephant, or a bench with a view) is that that there is a concrete or ab-
stract other that often is physically absent yet present in the experience. Many aesthetic 
theorists have sought to use the role of the artist, designer, aesthetic community, institu-
tion etc. and their actions, intentions and emotions for understanding what art is.31 
Again, I shall not pre-define but rather allow a heterogeneous role of the other in aes-
thetic experiences. However, in specific cases this need not be an unstructured nor em-
pirically impenetrable heterogeneity. I hypothesize a dynamic interplay between the 
beholder’s specific consideration of the virtual other(s) for the concrete psychological 
processes of appraisal and also the feeling of vulnerability in letting the artist as other 
in. Further, the other is not only present ‘behind’ the aesthetic object, but also as ‘co-
                                                
31 Collingwood (1958), Dickie (1974), Danto (1981). For a recent empirically minded inten-
tional theory see Pignocchi (2012). 
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beholder’, and I propose that the dynamics of this social influence again depends on the 
concrete affordances of the specific social relation, the actual or virtual presence etc.  
In ordinary face-to-face interactions there is a constant demand to plan and execute 
reactions as we are seen by the other. But if beholding involves an asymmetry of inter-
action, a halting of goal-oriented navigation, then this might allow us to open ourselves 
to an otherwise difficult intimacy with the perceptual experience and virtual other. In 
other words, the aesthetic stance predicts a potential for vulnerability and depth of sub-
jective involvement in aesthetic experience. In the aesthetic stance we can allow our-
selves to be moved and - as we have seen above – this influence of the beheld on the 
beholder can to a large extent be sensorimotor, emotional and happen outside of volun-
tary control.  
I propose that the psychological process of appraisal might play a role as a defense 
mechanism and gatekeeper of how far we will let ourselves be invaded by the aesthetic 
object or experience. When the other is out of sight – say at a desolate waterfall – we 
might still engage in appraisal processes of just how beautiful or meditation inducing 
this water is (possibly intensified by a guidebook or an Instagram). But my claim is that 
the way the other is present dynamically modulates appraisal. It would thus be odd to 
judge a painting by a toddler or by said elephant with the same critical fervor as applied 
at the MoMa. We need not strictly demarcate ‘art’ or ‘the Art world’ to make sense of 
these differences – to the contrary that would erase the details of social influence and of 
borderline cases. When the elephant painting doesn’t pretend to be anything but just 
that, how could it harm us? In a museum or a concert hall there is an underlying sense 
that one might be in front of a pinnacle of human civilization. Along with the ticket 
price this urges the question: is this truly good? Am I enjoying it? Am I impressed? 
Should I be? etc. In brief, artworks that claim to be something affords their beholder to 
appraise that exact claim. 
The role of the other is a big issue. My point is merely to draw attention to how - 
given the dynamic aesthetic stance framework - one can discuss the issue in new ways.   
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f. The question of beauty – and other perceptual attractors 
In art theory the once so central question of beauty has become increasingly mar-
ginalized due in part to the acknowledgement that lots of important artworks do not aim 
at beauty. However, the neuroscience of art is still preoccupied with the experience and 
appraisal of beauty. So much so that neuro-aesthetics in a recent review simply is de-
fined as a field “concerned with the neural underpinnings of aesthetic experience of 
beauty, particularly in visual art”.32 This narrow definition is not universally shared, but 
issues of beauty along with other questions of preference and emotional impact etc. has 
indeed guided much research. This discrepancy between the practice of neuroscience 
and that of artists and theorists does seem to highlight a lack of productive interdisci-
plinary communication. Under a dynamic approach, beauty can be hypothesized as a 
powerful aspect of how we are brought into and maintain the aesthetic stance. But 
beauty is not the only factor for emotional perceptual judgment, nor the only route to 
the aesthetic stance. Accordingly, the aesthetic powers of beauty - and ugliness – can 
be acknowledged without narrowing the scope of the aesthetic.  
Zeki and other neuroscientists often seem to treat judgments of beauty or the broader 
appreciation responses (like/don’t like) as the endpoint of an aesthetic experience. On 
the aesthetic stance frame beauty and appraisal are seen primarily as part of the proc-
esses bringing us into, trusting and maintaining certain aesthetic experiences. We can 
thus also have non-beautiful aesthetic experiences though these might rely other emo-
tional attractors and/or top-down processes of maintaining the experience. The process 
of sitting through a Lars von Trier movie, and other cases where artists deliberately 
make their audience uncomfortable, can exemplify this. The beholder’s decision to stay 
                                                
32 Di Dio & Gallese. (2009). 
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does not here hinge on beauty but on e.g. whether trust is abused in a non-abusive way, 
i.e. whether the experience gives us something worth keeping – worth beholding.  
 
g. The ethical and political force of aesthetics.  
The issues of the other, vulnerability, trust and abuse thereof, all alert us to another 
aspect of aesthetics that is rarely dealt with in neuroscience: namely, the ethical and po-
litical relevance, power and responsibilities of this area of human social interaction.33  
From the perspective of the aesthetic stance some of the main questions to be explored 
is the relationship between the ethical responsibility of the artist and institutions given 
the psychological impact of aesthetic experiences. The dangers, powers and conse-
quences of propaganda, political art and also of manhandling popular art would be 
valuable to explore with the tools of neuroscience. In respect to the later, a recent study 
showed that typical Hollywood movies determines both gaze and broader brain re-
sponse to a much larger degree than for example art movies or unedited clips of natural 
scenes.34 Hence, the systematically different affordances of the movie styles yielded 
rather different patterns of neurological response - and presumably experiences. Strong 
visual attractors seem to micro-manage brain involvement whereas more open aesthetic 
affordances offers room for personal involvement. Such empirical findings might in-
form “high-art/entertainment” discussions and possible responsibilities of funding and 
promoting junk-imagery in public spaces.35   
 
                                                
33 There are some studies showing shared neural correlates of judgments of beauty and moral 
goodness (Tsukiura & Cabeza (2010). This neuro-aristotelean finding deserves further explora-
tion, along with the correlation found between reward, motivation and beauty, love and OCD. 
(Aron et al. 2005). 
34 Hasson et al. (2008). 
35 This also challenges the idea of universality in Ramachandron’s visual attractor based 
principles. 
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Why a new framework?  
I have now discussed a series of dynamically interconnected inner and outer contex-
tual aspects of aesthetic experience, which I see as pivotal for understanding how we 
become aesthetic beholders. Some outlined dynamics of aesthetic experience have 
likely gone unnoticed due to the kind of modular and non-contextual assumptions of 
many researchers in neuroaesthetics and cognitive neuroscience in general. A model of 
aesthetic appreciation and judgment presented by Helmut Leder and colleagues can il-
lustrate this issue (fig 1)36 They should be lauded firstly for taking on the daunting task 
of actually visualizing the process, and secondly for including a wealth of interesting 
observations and plausible aspects relevant to the overall aesthetic experience in their 
model.   
 
 
Fig. 1. Model of aesthetic experience (Leder et al. 2004, based on model by Helmut Leder). 
 
                                                
36 Leder et al. (2004). Many warm thanks to Helmut Leder for his generocity in providing a 
figure structurally similar to the model of the original 2004 publication. 
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Their proposed model shows five separate stages of cognitive processing supporting 
aesthetic experience, from basic implicit low-level perceptual analysis (automatic) to 
more explicit and top-down problem solving and evaluative processes informed by 
prior knowledge (deliberate). Parallel emotional influences are shown to influence 
these stages and external contextual and social influences are shown to modulate the 
aesthetic input and output. I agree that these factors are important for aesthetic experi-
ence. 
However, implicit in the model is an assumption of information processing, i.e. that 
the mind is a modular machinery, which goes from perceptual “inputs” (artwork + con-
textual factors) through a pre-set series of independent stages towards a set of “outputs” 
(“aesthetic judgment” & “aesthetic emotion”). This is clearly a simplified and non-
literal model, but the question is whether the inherent cognitive structure is misleading.  
The core question is whether the model’s ‘one-size fits all’ structure of pre-set serial 
input-output stages limits the possibilities of dynamic interaction in concrete contexts, 
which I have suggested is crucial for understanding how we become beholders in the 
fist place. Such dynamics would indicate that the very idea of itemized ‘inputs’ and 
‘outputs’ is inherently problematic. In terms of ‘inputs’, the distinction between the 
aesthetic and non-aesthetic hinges in this model on a pre-classification-box, which is 
influenced by context, but unrelated to the perceivers embodied engagement.  
In terms of ‘outputs’ the proposal is here 1) an emotion and 2) an explicit and shara-
ble judgment. But this itemization seems to obscure the notion that aesthetic experi-
ences matter because they literally move and transform our embodied engagement and 
minds. The verb ‘to behold’ also means ‘to keep’ (German ‘behalten’). The metaphor 
of beholding is thus not just about perceptual consideration but additionally involves a 
temporal holding – that somehow make it possible to “take in” what is perceived. If we 
literally let aesthetically considered objects in, then that informs the seeming vulner-
ability that is part of becoming a beholder. I proposed that appraisal in aesthetic experi-
ence might be tightly connected to vulnerability and function as a defense mechanism. 
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However, these dynamics of change and embodied moves to explore, approach and 
avoid certain artworks are difficult to express in this sort of schematic.37  
My proposal is that we need a new model structure – one that allows us to study the 
inner and outer contextual and embodied dynamics of becoming a beholder. Thus, in 
the apple eating-beholding example above, one might ask whether there are two differ-
ent kinds of perceptual processes going on and how these dynamically relate to contex-
tual factors and embodied responses and attitudes. If so then we need to include such 
dynamic influences in our models already at the level of perception of object features. 
 
An example: Joshua Bell & the morning commuters  
The problem of isolating aesthetic stimuli in the lab can be elucidated by a not very 
scientific but nonetheless ingenious experiment by Gene Weingarten of the Washington 
Post. He enrolled famous violinist Joshua Bell, who normally plays at sold-out grand 
concerts, to play Bach incognito at a DC subway station in the morning rush hour. Bell 
played for 45 min for about 1000 passing morning commuters. How did people react to 
these “pearls before breakfast” as Weingarten entitled the ensuing article? Leaving out 
the interesting details, the short answer is that most hardly reacted at all!38  Passer-bys 
must arguably have perceived some chunks of the music in that it was physically audi-
ble, and yet it seems many failed to listen in an aesthetically involved sense. Many 
might have sensed an appeal of the music but yet in their morning mindset failed to get 
engaged by the unknown street musician on their busy path. One might suggest that 
various passer-bys who listened were beholders for divergent reasons and to different 
                                                
37 On the Leder model change is indicated by arrows leading to the boxes in the top row of 
knowledge & prior experience, which then can inform other aesthetic experiences, but the per-
ceptual process seem insulated from such interactions.  
38 Weingarten, G. (2007) 
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degrees, and that their experiences – and the neural correlates thereof – differentiated 
accordingly.   
The point of this example is that these sorts of dynamic differences cannot be studied 
by flashing 4s images to passive perceivers in scanners. In other words, by relying on 
pre-classifications and highly stereotyped perceptual scenarios many typical experi-
mental paradigms of neuro-aesthetics ignore questions of when, how, under what cir-
cumstances and with what effect we become beholders. My claim is that without a 
more dynamic and temporal framework questions about aesthetic experiences such as 
why they matter, and why can we feel vulnerable, touched or violated by such – cannot 
be explored experimentally. 
 
The aesthetic stance hypothesis 
The aesthetic stance can now be sketched as a theoretically framework.39 The main 
purpose the framework and the “aesthetic stance” notion is to theorize the temporal and 
dynamic process of becoming - and ceasing to be - an aesthetic beholder.40 Further, it is 
the ambition to do so in an empirically applicable way. Some of the core ideas of the 
aesthetic stance are firstly that being a beholder means that we temporarily let go of our 
regular practical and goal-directed stance. Secondly beholding is thought of as an em-
                                                
39 Jesse Prinz has recently and independently developed an “aesthetic stance” notion (Prinz, 
2011), in relation to a discussion of when films count as art. His ideas has some similarities but 
are importantly differentiated from the present view in that the stance is thought of as a psycho-
logical state. He writes; “I use the phrase “aesthetic stance” to refer to a psychological state in 
which aesthetic principles are recruited in the evaluation of a work. Elsewhere I argue that aes-
thetic principles are basically triggers from aesthetic emotions: some features elicit these emo-
tions in us.” In contrast my use of the notion hinges on actual embodiment and is used to stress 
the contextual & temporal dynamics of aesthetic experiences. 
40 To my knowledge there are no other theories of how an aesthetic experiences begin/end, 
nor of the dynamics of how & when they are engaged/disengaged. 
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bodied equilibrium and as a contextually sensitive process of varying characteristics, 
degree and intensity. Overall I hypothesize that aesthetic experiences are indeed a spe-
cial subset of perceptual experiences, but distinguished through these relative dynamic 
relations rather than object features and attitudes alone. Based on the core aspects of the 
dynamics of the aesthetic stance covered in previous sections, we can put together a 
preliminary model and rough list of hypothesized influential elements and candidates 
for further empirical exploration.   
 
Key aspects in the dynamics of the aesthetic stance (see fig. 2):  
A. A dynamic opposition between a practical and an aesthetic stance and ac-
cordingly opposed modes of brain function.  
B. Aesthetic affordances  
1. “Edge of action” affordances invites a pause & executive action halt 
2. Salient stimuli properties & perceptual attractors (universal, personal 
and situated) as effective in grapping attention as well as maintaining it.  
C. Vulnerability and openness of the perceiver – linked to lack of goal-directed 
attitude in regards to action planning.  
D. The role of appraisal and taste as a gatekeeper and defense mechanism – 
needed as ballast to counter openness. 
E. The role of “the other” – and its relation to appraisal, vulnerability & en-
gagement.  
F. The specificity of encounters; the aesthetic stance, incl. low-level physio-





Fig. 2. Time slice of an ‘aesthetic stance’ equilibrium – Daumier meets Schiele41  
To further understand this model I will try to clarify some points about the dynamics 
that it attempt to capture and how it compares to previous theoretical models and pro-
posals.  
Firstly, as mentioned when discussing the Leder model it is helpful to see this aes-
thetic hypothesis as a part of a larger dynamic conception of the mind, compatible with 
various versions of the embodied mind hypothesis.42 The key dynamic features to be 
stressed here are the following:  
1. External affordances of the perceptual event as well as the embedded cultural 
framings can change the experiential process and the ‘inner context’ of the per-
ceiver.   
2. The inner psychological & neurobiological context i.e. current moods, practical 
tasks and embodied rhythms, motions and emotions of the perceiver shape not 
                                                
41 Artworks in Figure 2: Honoré Daumier, Dimanche au Musée and Egon Schiele, Mime van 
Osen mit aneinandergelegten Fingerspitzen 
42 Without general consensus on a positive theory of the embodied – and dynamic, contextual 
and social - mind, this article should be seen as contributing to a new model rather than as sim-
ply agreeing with one of the formulations already out there. See e.g. Varela et al (1992), John-
son (2008) or Di Paolo et al. (2010).  
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only the perceptual experience but also the very process of the perceptual en-
gagement.  
3. These multidimensional aspects dynamically interact over time, in a concrete 
bodily space. Meaning e.g. that the mere absence of an influence can enhance 
the influences of other causally relevant features. 
Secondly, my take on ‘disinterestedness’ is not one of emotional detachment, but 
simply a letting go of a goal-directed attitude. It is a negative parameter that allows for 
a cascade of consequences. When we navigate and perceive the world through active 
action, there seems to be little room for aesthetic involvement. I propose that the aes-
thetic stance precisely represents a momentary denial of the practical attitude, a pause 
in the flow of hierarchical action planning, which is crucial in allowing aesthetic ab-
sorption and depth of experience. The “detachment” from action thus is not meant to 
preclude emotional involvement but rather promotes a receptiveness, where the pause 
of in action allows the experience to play with our emotions, sensorimotor resonance 
and potentially with our memories and imagination.43   
Thirdly, the label “aesthetic stance” is purposively embodied and causally multi-
directional – it is meant as a stance in the sense of being an active and physical bodily 
positioning and psychological attitude, and yet responding to and embedded in envi-
ronment affordances. One way of getting at this Merleau-Pontian chiasm is to say pur-
ported ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes intersect already in the body and in the 
extended meeting of perceiver and context.  
Fourthly, as I see aesthetic experiences as shaped contextually, and many emotional 
and embodied responses are hypothesized to take place involuntarily and below aware-
ness, I accordingly oppose an exclusive focus on top-down voluntary control of the aes-
thetic attitude. This is important given e.g. Schopenhauer’s idea of ‘willful aesthetic de-
                                                
43 I have referred to findings of sensorimotor responses, and to how there might be ‘more 
room’ for the perceived event to ‘fill’ our sensorimotor circuits when no reaction is afforded. 
Such “space for involvement” might however also be found in relation to other brain circuits, 
e.g. supporting memory process, as discussed below. 
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tachment’44 and similar current proposals. An interesting comparative example here is 
the approach of Gerald Cupchik. Cupchik has contributed abundant and incredibly his-
torically informed theoretical and empirical work, and he even empirically explores the 
aesthetic attitude as hinging on “psychological distance”. He suggests, like me, that 
there is an opposition between the aesthetic attitude and more pragmatic relations to 
perceived objects. However, his conception of how we assume the aesthetic attitude 
seems to follow the view of Schopenhauer, i.e. he sees it as a rather explicit and volun-
tary process seemingly on the side of ‘top-down’ cognitive influences. He thus con-
trasts the aesthetic attitude to a “strong and automatic”45 inclination to assume a practi-
cal object oriented attitude, and thus seems to preclude that aesthetic involvement can 
be contextual or automatic.46 As opposed to Cupchik my aesthetic stance hypothesis is 
not assuming a mental attitude, but applies to the temporally extended physiological 
processes by which aesthetic experiences are established and also dismantled again. 
Note, that this is not to say that voluntary mental attitudes do not play into the dynam-
ics of aesthetic experience. Rather, I claim such explicit attitudes are insufficient to un-
derstanding the manifold of aesthetic experiences and their complex temporal and em-
bodied evolution through ‘inner’ and ‘outer’, ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ influences.  
Lastly, it cannot be stressed enough that under a process-oriented framework aes-
thetic experiences need not be ‘all-or-none’. Rather, an analysis of the aspects contrib-
uting to specific experiences could be used to elucidate rather than eradicate borderline 
cases and their respective temporal and contextual structure.47 
                                                
44 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation.  
45 Cupchik 2009, p. 84. See also 2002 article on psychological distance, which gives a great 
historical introduction. 
46 Cupchik picks a paradigm where “object recognition” is contrasted with a focus on color & 
style. These instructions yield a contrast of content exploration but ignore the larger embodied 
contextual dynamics and don’t seem to get at the core differential of the aesthetic and the action-
oriented. 
47 I am actually not opposed to the idea that all perceptual experiences are aesthetic to some 




Future directions of the aesthetic stance  
Very well you might say, but how do we apply this to neuroscience? The effort to 
make these aspects explicit is as mentioned intended to facilitate the use of the frame-
work in empirical studies, which then further can test, correct and develop the ‘Aes-
thetic Stance 1.0’. An area that could serve as a first meeting ground for the aesthetic 
stance approach and neuroscience is the study of the brain’s ‘large-scale networks’. I 
shall conclude by looking at some of these findings of broad network interactions. First 
because they seem to support the general idea of dynamic and contextual brain func-
tions, and more specifically my ideas about the implications and conditions for becom-
ing a beholder, and how it contrasts with the goal-oriented action mode. But also be-
cause these findings help us pose new fascinating – and yet empirically tractable - 
questions. 
  
a. The dynamics of large-scale brain networks  
Although Hans Berger found activity in the resting brain already in the 1920’s, the 
discovery had little impact48 though until about a decade ago due to findings by e.g. 
Marcus Raichle and colleagues.49 They confirmed the high baseline activity during 
awake rest, and further that this far from random activity relies on an extensive and 
                                                
48 Ideas of large-scale activity where advanced by several scientists already in the 70’s such 
Freeman, Edelman and Mountcastle for example, and for precursors in the 90’s see Bressler et 
al. (1995). 
49 Raichle et al. (2001) A default mode of brain function. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 98, 
676–682. 
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highly coordinated network of areas. The network – due to its correlation with rest - 
became known as the brains ‘default mode network’.50 Interestingly the network was 
thus defined negatively; as pertaining to the brain function when not engaged in any 
explicit task or action. It has since been found that this network of areas is involved in 
various memory and social tasks as well as in self-referential thought and reward 
evaluations over time.51 Due to these later findings an overall ‘mental time travel’ func-
tion has been proposed, i.e. projection of oneself into non-current or imagined con-
texts.52 This hypothesis fits well with the networks lone activity in the absence of a task 
or present ‘affordances’ to navigate.53  
Two additional core large-scale networks have been discovered through analyzing 
the brains intrinsic connectivity.54 The ‘executive network’ pertains to top-down control 
of action and cognitive tasks involving working memory, and its activity has been 
found to consistently impose a deactivation of the default network and vice versa.55 The 
so-called ‘salience network’ is thought to play a critical role in the detection of salient 
and valuable stimuli, and has recently been shown to play a crucial role in this oppos-
ing switching between the default and the executive networks as a response not only to 
external stimuli but also internal homeostatic needs.56     
                                                
50 See Buckner (2008) and Bressler & Menon (2010) for an overview of the basic findings. 
51 See for example Hassabis & Maguire (2007) and Bar (2007) 
52 Buckner & Carroll (2007) 
53 For intrinsic/extrinsic distinction see Gollard et al (2007). Brincker (2010) argues that 
fronto-parietal areas track the current affordance space and integrates this with prefrontal action 
planning. The default system by contrast might represent thoughts not under current practical 
navigational control - be it with actual limbs or e.g. mathematical moves in abstract space. 
There could thus be many scenarios where the default system contributes to ongoing perceptual 
tasks – namely when non-present affordances can inform the navigation. For tentative support 
this hypothetical idea see e.g. Gerlach et al. (2011). 
54 These are unlikely to be the only large-scale networks, but more complexity here is beyond 
my present scope. 
55 Raichle et al. (2001) Buckner (2008) & Kelly et al. (2007). 
56 Particularly the right fronto-insula region seems to be crucial in the switching process. See 
Seeley et al. (2007), Sridharan et al. (2008), Corbetta & Shulman (2002) & Callejas et al (2005). 
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b. Brain dynamics meet aesthetics 
The seemingly mutual counter actions of the executive and the default network and 
the role of inner and outer salience for their dynamic switching are extremely notewor-
thy given the hypothesis of aesthetic beholding that I have proposed. It looks like pre-
liminary neuroscientific support of the Kantian idea that a non-practical mode (switch-
ing off the executive system) is necessary for aesthetic involvement in the form of “free 
play of the imagination”(default system). How does this work? One might jump to the 
idea that aesthetically salient stimuli features (salience network) might switch off the 
executive network and switch on the imagination, aka the default network, and voila 
aesthetic experience! However, the great thing about biology is that findings always 
prove more complicated than theories. Recent studies in this young field of research 
suggest that, even though these networks are anatomically distinct and consistently 
show mutually exclusive spontaneous action during rest, some sub-areas – or ‘nodes’ – 
seem to be functionally connected during various complex real life tasks.57 
A recent study by Nava Rubin’s lab explored the relationship between the intensity 
of subjective experiences of visual artworks and regional brain modulation.58 Interest-
ingly, they found that the artworks, which were rated as moving subjects most in-
tensely, irrespective of perceptual features,59 activated several areas within the default 
system, whereas less emotionally intense experiences failed to produce any default sys-
tem activity. Similar step-like activations for only intensely rated experiences were 
found in certain sub-cortical areas within the salience network. These findings are fas-
                                                
57 Leech et al. (2011), Christoff et al. (2009) & Harrison et al. (2008). See also footnote 43. 
58 Vessel, Starr & Rubin (2012) 
59 There was such a great variability in the ratings that each image that by some was given 
the highest rating was also by others given the lowest, which when one compares results by way 
of ratings then controls for the effect of the perceptual qualities of individual images used. See 
Vessel et al. (2012) 
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cinating from the perspective of the dynamics sketched above, and invite new questions 
about appraisal and the role of the subjective relevance of artwork not only for intense 
emotional aesthetic experiences but also for salience and emotional engagement in low-
level perception. I earlier contrasted a dynamic framework to more modular models of 
aesthetic experience. Here we see evidence that subjective variability interacts not only 
with the appraisal as an “output”, but with which brain network gets involved in the 
aesthetic experience in the first place. Further, the study raises questions, e.g. about the 
‘not so intense’ artwork experiences, which were found to not modulate the default sys-
tem at all, and about the general role of appraisal in dynamically shaping the experience 
and its neural underpinnings.  
Given the aesthetic stance we can understand these dynamic findings as enriching 
the basic framework and the new questions they raise seem to be empirically tractable. 
To test the core aesthetic stance hypothesis we need for example a better understanding 
of the interaction within and between large-scale networks in response to different 
viewing contexts, prior knowledge etc. Further, it is crucial to understand the role not 
simply of the executive system as a whole, but whether the top-down control of action 
– i.e. the executive influence specifically on the parietal areas of perceptual and spatial 
navigation – is inhibited during aesthetic experiences. It is compatible with my hy-
pothesis that parts of the ‘executive system’ play a role in appraisal and top-down at-
tention modulation. Findings in this area could also help us understand the precarious 
relation between intimacy, vulnerability and the idea of appraisal as a possible gate-
keeper. Similarly, one could ask whether beauty – as often assumed – is tied to the he-
donic outcome of aesthetic appreciation, or as I have speculated above also could play a 
‘salience network’ role in engaging and maintaining an aesthetic stance along with 
other emotional “perceptual attractors”60. Another hypothesis to be explored empiri-
cally is whether the affordance structure of the environment plays a role in inhibiting or 
                                                
60 See here the contrast to the discussed ideas of Zeki, Ramachandran & Leder.  
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promoting a goal-directed attitude and thus the likelihood of aesthetic involvement. 
Overall, the frame of large-scale networks along with the aesthetic stance hypothesis 
could help us reinterpret many past neuroaesthetic findings that have been produced 
under more modular paradigms.61  
In conclusion, I have outlined an “aesthetic stance” model, which is a dynamic and 
embodied framework for an empirically minded study of aesthetics. I have pointed to 
various empirical and phenomenological observations that support each of its aspects. 
However, I have also purposively opened up more cans of worms than I can close 
again, and the aim of this piece is to call for interdisciplinary engagement. I pointed to 
theoretical limitations in current neuroaesthetics, but also to tools for overcoming these. 
More specifically I call for more attention to dynamic, contextual, social and temporal 
aspects of both aesthetics and brain functioning.  
 
                                                
61 As long as one studies the fine print of the method sections and uncovers the implicit as-
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